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IDENTITY, PRIVACY, and ANONYMITY on the INTERNET ================================================ (c) Copyright 1993 L. Detweiler. Not for commercial use except by permission from author, otherwise may be freely copied. Not to be altered. Please credit if quoted. SUMMARY ======= Information on email and account privacy, anonymous mailing and posting, encryption, and other privacy and rights issues associated with use of the Internet and global networks in general. (Search for <#.#> for exact section. Search for '_' (underline) for next section.) PART 1 ====== (this file) Identity -------- <1.1> What is `identity' on the internet? <1.2> Why is identity (un)important on the internet? <1.3> How does my email address (not) identify me and my background? <1.4> How can I find out more about somebody from their email address? <1.5> Why is identification (un)stable on the internet? <1.6> What is the future of identification on the internet? Privacy ------- <2.1> What is `privacy' on the internet? <2.2> Why is privacy (un)important on the internet? <2.3> How (in)secure are internet networks? <2.4> How (in)secure is my account? <2.5> How (in)secure are my files and directories? <2.6> How (in)secure is X Windows? <2.7> How (in)secure is my email? <2.8> How am I (not) liable for my email and postings? <2.9> How do I provide more/less information to others on my identity? <2.10> Who is my sysadmin? What does s/he know about me? <2.11> Why is privacy (un)stable on the internet? <2.12> What is the future of privacy on the internet? Anonymity --------- <3.1> What is `anonymity' on the internet? <3.2> Why is `anonymity' (un)important on the internet? <3.3> How can anonymity be protected on the internet? <3.4> What is `anonymous mail'? <3.5> What is `anonymous posting'? <3.6> Why is anonymity (un)stable on the internet? <3.7> What is the future of anonymity on the internet? PART 2 ====== (next file) Issues ------ <4.1> What is the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)? <4.2> Who are Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR)? <4.3> What was `Operation Sundevil' and the Steve Jackson Game case? <4.4> What is Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN)? <4.5> What is the National Research and Education Network (NREN)? <4.6> What is the FBI's proposed Digital Telephony Act? <4.7> What is U.S. policy on freedom/restriction of strong encryption? <4.8> What other U.S. legislation is related to privacy? <4.9> What are references on rights in cyberspace? <4.10> What is the Computers and Academic Freedom (CAF) archive? Clipper ------- <5.1> What is the Clipper Chip Initiative? <5.2> How does Clipper blunt `cryptography's dual-edge sword'? <5.3> Why are technical details of the Clipper chip being kept secret? <5.4> Who was consulted in the development of the Clipper chip? <5.5> How is commerical use/export of Clipper chips regulated? <5.6> What are references on the Clipper Chip? <5.7> What are compliments/criticisms of the Clipper chip? <5.8> What are compliments/criticisms of the Clipper Initiative? <5.9> What are compliments/criticisms of the Clipper announcement? <5.10> Where does Clipper fit in U.S. cryptographic technology policy? PART 3 ====== (last file) Resources --------- <6.1> What UNIX programs are related to privacy? <6.2> How can I learn about or use cryptography? <6.3> What is the cypherpunks mailing list? <6.4> What are some privacy-related newsgroups? FAQs? <6.5> What is internet Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM)? <6.6> What are other Request For Comments (RFCs) related to privacy? <6.7> How can I run an anonymous remailer? <6.8> What are references on privacy in email? <6.9> What are some email, Usenet, and internet use policies? Miscellaneous ------------- <7.1> What is ``digital cash''? <7.2> What is a ``hacker'' or ``cracker''? <7.3> What is a ``cypherpunk''? <7.4> What is `steganography' and anonymous pools? <7.5> What is `security through obscurity'? <7.6> What are `identity daemons'? <7.7> What standards are needed to guard electronic privacy? Footnotes --------- <8.1> What is the background behind the Internet? <8.2> How is Internet `anarchy' like the English language? <8.3> Most Wanted list <8.4> Change history * * * IDENTITY ======== _____ <1.1> What is `identity' on the internet? Generally, today people's `identity' on the internet is primarily determined by their email address in the sense that this is their most unchanging 'face' in the electronic realm. This is your login name qualified by the complete address domain information, for example ``ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu''. People see this address when receiving mail or reading USENET posts from you and in other situations where programs record usage. Some obsolete forms of addresses (such as BITNET) still persist. In email messages, additional information on the path that a message takes is prepended to the message received by the recipient. This information identifies the chain of hosts involved in the transmission and is a very accurate trace of its origination. This type of identify-and-forward protocol is also used in the USENET protocol to a lesser extent. Forging these fields requires corrupted mailing software at sites involved in the forwarding and is very uncommon. Not so uncommon is forging the chain at the origination point, so that all initial sites in the list are faked at the time the message is created. Tracing these messages can be difficult or impossible when the initial faked fields are names of real machines and represent real transfer routes. _____ <1.2> Why is identity (un)important on the internet? The concept of identity is closely intertwined with communication, privacy, and security, which in turn are all critical aspects of computer networks. For example, the convenience of communication afforded by email would be impossible without conventions for identification. But there are many potential abuses of identity possible that can have very severe consequences, with massive computer networks at the forefront of the issue, which can potentially either exacerbate or solve these problems. Verifying that an identity is correct is called `authentication', and one classic example of the problems associated with it is H.G. Well's ``War of the Worlds'' science fiction story adapted to a radio broadcast that fooled segments of the population into thinking that an alien invasion was in progress. Hoaxes of this order are not uncommon on Usenet and forged identities makes them more insidious. People and their reputations can be assaulted by forgery. However, the fluidity of identity on the internet is for some one of its most attractive features. Identity is just as useful as it is harmful. A professor might carefully explain a topic until he finds he is talking to an undergraduate. A person of a particular occupation may be able to converse with others who might normally shun him. Some prejudices are erased, but, on the other hand, many prejudices are useful! A scientist might argue he can better evaluate the findings of a paper as a reviewer if he knows more about the authors. Likewise, he may be more likely to reject it based on unfair or irrelevant criteria. On the other side of the connection, the author may find identities of reviewers useful in exerting pressure for acceptance. Identity is especially crucial in establishing and regulating `credit' (not necessarily financial) and `ownership' and `usage'. Many functions in society demand reliable and accurate techniques for identification. Heavy reliance will be placed on digital authentication as global economies become increasingly electronic. Many government functions and services are based on identification, and law enforcement frequently hinges on it. Hence, employees of many government organizations push toward stronger identification structures. But when does identification invade privacy? The growth of the internet is provoking social forces of massive proportions. Decisions made now on issues of identity will affect many future users, especially as the network becomes increasingly global, universal, widespread, and entrenched; and the positive or adverse affects of these actions, intended and inadvertent, will literally be magnified exponentially. _____ <1.3> How does my email address (not) identify me and my background? Your email address may contain information that influences people's perceptions of your background. The address may `identify' you as from a department at a particular university, an employee at a company, or a government worker. It may contain your last name, initials, or cryptic identification codes independent of both. In the US some are based on parts of social security numbers. Others are in the form 'u2338' where the number is incremented in the order that new users are added to the system. Standard internet addresses also can contain information on your broad geographical location or nationhood. However, none of this information is guaranteed to be correct or be there at all. The fields in the domain qualification of the username are based on rather arbitrary organization, such as (mostly invisible) network cabling distributions. The only point to make is that early fields in the address are more specific (such as specific computer names or local networks) and the later ones the most general (such as continental domains). Typically the first field is the name of the computer receiving mail. Gleaning information from the email address alone is sometimes an inspired art or an inconsistent and futile exercise. (For more information, see the FAQs on email addresses and known geographical distributions below.) However, UNIX utilities exist to aid in the quest (see the question on this). Common Suffixes --------------- .us United States .uk United Kingdom .ca Canada .fi Finland .au Australia .edu university or college .com commercial organization .org 'other' (e.g. nonprofit organization) .gov government .mil military site _____ <1.4> How can I find out more about somebody with a given email address? One simple way is to send email to that address, asking. Another way is to send mail to the postmaster at that address (i.e. postmaster@address), although the postmaster's job is more to help find user ID's of particular people given their real name and solve mail routing problems. The sysadmin (i.e. `root@address') may also be able to supply information. Users with related email address may have information. However, all of these methods rely on the time and patience of others so use them minimally. One of the most basic tools for determining identity over the internet is the UNIX utility 'finger'. The basic syntax is: finger user@here.there.everywhere This utility uses communication protocols to query the computer named in the address for information on the user named. The response is generated completely by the receiving computer and may be in any format. Possible responses are as follows: - A message `unknown host' meaning some aspect of the address is incorrect, two lines with no information and '???'. - A message 'In real life: ???' in which case the receiving computer could not find any kind of a match on the username. The finger utility may return this response in other situations. - A listing of information associated with multiple users. Some computers will search only for matching user IDs, others will attempt to find the username you specified as a substring of all actual full names of users kept in a local database. At some sites 'finger' can be used to get a list of all users on the system with a `finger @address'. In general this is often considered weak security, however, because `attackers' know valid user ID's to `crack' passwords. More information on the fields returned by `finger' is given below. More information on `finger' and locating people's email addresses is given in the email FAQ (such as the WHOIS lookup utility). Just as you can use these means to find out about others, they can use them to find out about you. You can `finger' yourself to find out what is publicly reported by your UNIX system about you. Be careful when modifying `finger' data; virtually anyone with internet access worldwide can query this information. In one famous case, the New York Times writer J. Markoff uncovered the identity of R. Morris, author of the Internet Worm, through the use of `finger' after an anonymous caller slipped by revealing his initials which were also his login ID. See the book Cyberpunk by K. Hafner and J. Markoff. _____ <1.5> Why is identification (un)stable on the internet? Generally, identity is an amorphous and almost nonexistent concept on the Internet for a variety of reasons. One is the inherent fluidity of `cyberspace' where people emerge and submerge frequently, and absences are not readily noted in the `community'. Most people remember faces and voices, the primary means of casual identification in the 'real world'. The arbitary and cryptic sequences of letters and digits comprising most email addresses are not particularly noticeable or memorable and far from a unique identification of an individual, who may use multiple accounts on multiple machines anywhere in the world. Currently internet users do not really have any great assurances that the messages in email and USENET are from who they appear to be. A person's mailing address is far from an identification of an individual. - Anyone with access to the account, e.g. they know the password, either legitimately or otherwise, can send mail with that address in the From: line. - Email addresses for an individual tend to change frequently as they switch jobs or make moves inside their organizations. - As part of current mailing protocol standards, forging the From: line in mail messages is a fairly trivial operation for many hackers. The status and path information prepended to messages by intermediate hosts is generally unforgeable. In general, while possible, forgeries are fairly rare on most newsgroups and in email. Besides these pathological cases abve there are many basic problems with today's internet protocols affecting identification on the internet: - Internet mail standards, described in RFC-822, are still evolving rapidly and not entirely orderly. For example, standards for mail address `munging' or `parsing' tend to vary slightly between sites and frequently mean the difference between finding addresses and bouncing mail. - Domain names and computer names are frequently changed at sites, and there are delays in the propagation of this data. - Addresses cannot be resolved when certain critical computers crash, such as the receiving computer or other computers involved in resolving names into addresses called `nameservers'. - A whole slew of problems is associated with `nameservers'; if they are not updated they will not find name addresses, and even the operation of what constitutes `updating' has different interpretations at different sites. The current internet mailing and addressing protocols are slightly anachronistic in that they were created when the network was somewhat obscure and not widespread, with only a fraction of the traffic it now sees. Today a large proportion of internet traffic is email, comprising millions of messages. _____ <1.6> What is the future of identification on the internet? Some new technologies and standards are introducing facial images and voice messages into mail and these will improve the sense of community that comes from the familiarity of identification. However, they are not currently widespread, require large amounts of data transfer, standardized software, and make some compromises in privacy. Promising new cryptographic techniques may make 'digital signatures' and 'digital authentication' common (see below). Also, the trend in USENET standards is toward greater authentication of posted information. On the other hand, advances in ensuring anonymity (such as remailers) are forthcoming. See below. PRIVACY ======= _____ <2.1> What is `privacy' on the internet? Generally, while `privacy' has multiple connotations in society and perhaps even more on the internet, in cyberspace most take it to mean that you have exclusive use and access to your account and the data stored on and and directed to it (such as email), and you do not encounter arbitrary restrictions or searches. In other words, others may obtain data associated with your account, but not without your permission. These ideas are probably both fairly limiting and liberal in their scope in what most internet users consider their private domains. Some users don't expect or want any privacy, some expect and demand it. _____ <2.2> Why is privacy (un)important on the internet? This is a somewhat debatable and inflammatory topic, arousing passionate opinions. On the internet, some take privacy for granted and are rudely surprised to find it tenuous or nonexistent. Most governments have rules that protect privacy (such as the illegal search and seizure clause of the U.S. constitution, adopted by others) but have many that are antithetical to it (such as laws prohibiting secret communications or allowing wiretapping). These rules generally carry over to the internet with few specific rules governing it. However, the legal repercussions of the global internet are still largely unknown and untested (i.e. no strong legal precedents and court cases). The fact that internet traffic frequently passes past international boundaries, and is not centrally managed, significantly complicates and strongly discourages its regulation. _____ <2.3> How (in)secure are internet networks? - `Theoretically' people at any site in the chain of sites with access to hardware and network media that transmits data over the Internet could potentially monitor or archive it. However, the sheer volume and general 'noise' inherent to this data makes these scenarios highly improbable, even by government agencies with supposedly vast funding and resources. - Technologies exist to `tap' magnetic fields given off by electrical wires without detection. Less obscurely, any machine with a network connection is a potential station for traffic detection, but this scenario requires knowledge and access to very low-level hardware (the network card) to pursue, if even possible. - A company Network General Inc. is one of many that manufactures and markets sophisticated network monitoring tools that can 'filter' and read packets by arbitrary criteria for troubleshooting purposes, but the cost of this type of device is prohibitive for casual use. Known instances of the above types of security breaches at a major scale (such as at network hubs) are very rare. The greatest risks tend to emerge locally. Note that all these approaches are almost completely defused with the use of cryptography. _____ <2.4> How (in)secure is my account? By default, not very. There are a multitude of factors that may reinforce or compromise aspects of your privacy on the internet. First, your account must be secure from other users. The universal system is to use a password, but if it is `weak' (i.e. easy to guess) this security is significantly diminished. Somewhat surprisingly and frighteningly to some, certain users of the system, particularly the administrator, generally have unlimited access regardless of passwords, and may grant that access to others. This means that they may read any file in your account without detection. Furthermore, not universally known, most UNIX systems keep fairly extensive accounting records of when and where you logged in, what commands you execute, and when they are executed (in fact, login information is usually public). Most features of this `auditing' or `process accounting' information are enabled by default after the initial installation and the system administrator may customize it to strengthen or weaken it to satisfy performance or privacy aims. This information is frequently consulted for troubleshooting purposes and may otherwise be ignored. This data tracks unsuccessful login attempts and other 'suspicious' activities on the system. A traditional part of the UNIX system that tracks user commands is easily circumvented by the user with the use of symbolic links (described in 'man ln'). UNIX implementations vary widely particularly in tracking features and new sophisticated mechanisms are introduced by companies regularly. Typically system adminstrators augment the basic UNIX functionality with public-domain programs and locally-developed tools for monitoring, and use them only to isolate `suspicious' activity as it arises (e.g. remote accesses to the 'passwd' file, incorrect login attempts, remote connection attempts, etc.). Generally, you should expect little privacy on your account for various reasons: - Potentially, every keystroke you type could be intercepted by someone else. - System administrators make extensive backups that are completely invisible to users which may record the states of an account over many weeks. - Erased files can, under many operating systems, be undeleted. - Most automated services keep logs of use for troubleshooting or otherwise; for example FTP sites usually log the commands and record the domain originations of users, including anonymous ones. - Some software exacerbates these problems. See the section on ``X Windows (in)security''. Indepedent of malevolent administrators are fellow users, a much more commonly harmful threat. There are multiple ways to help ensure that your account will not be accessed by others, and compromises can often be traced to failures in these guidelines: - Choose a secure password. Change it periodically. - Make sure to logout always. - Do not leave a machine unattended for long. - Make sure no one watches you when you type your password. - Avoid password references in email. - Be conservative in the use of the .rhost file. - Use utilities like `xlock' to protect a station, but be considerate. Be wary of situations where you think you should supply your password. There are only several basic situations where UNIX prompts you for a password: when you are logging in to a system or changing your password. Situations can arise in which prompts for passwords are forged by other users, especially in cases where you are talking to them (such as Internet Relay Chat). Also, be aware that forged login screens are one method to illegitimately obtain passwords. (Thanks to Jim Mattson <mattson@cs.ucsd.edu> for contributions here.) _____ <2.5> How (in)secure are my files and directories? The most important privacy considerations are related to file rights, and many lapses can be traced to their misunderstood nature or haphazard maintenance. Be aware of the rights associated with your files and directories in UNIX. If the `x' (`execute') right on your parent directory is off for users, groups, and other, these users cannot gain information on anything in your directories. Anything less may allow others to read, change, or even delete files in your home directory. The rights on a directory supersede the rights associated with files in that directory. For a directory, 'x' means that access to the files (or subdirectories) in the directory is possible -- if you know their names. To list the contents of the directory, however, requires the 'r' right. By default most accounts are accessable only to the owner, but the initial configuration varies between sites based on administrator preference. The default file mode specifies the initial rights associated with newly created files, and can be set in the shell with `umask'. The details of rights implementations tend to vary between versions of UNIX. Consult man pages on `chmod' and `ls'. Examples -------- traver.lance % ls -ld ~ drwx------ 15 ld231782 1536 Jan 31 21:22 /users/ld231782/ Here is a listing of the rights associated with a user's home directory, denoted by `~'. The columns at the left identify what rights are available. The first column identifies the entry as a directory, and the next three columns mean that read, write, and execute rights, respectively, are permitted for that user. For directories, the `x' right means that contents (file and subdirectory names) within that directory can be listed. The subsequent columns indicate that no other users have any rights to anything in the directory tree originating at that point. They can't even `see' any lower files or subdirectories; the hierarchy is completely invisible to them. traver.lance % ls -l msg -rw-r--r-- 1 ld231782 35661 Jan 29 23:13 msg traver.lance % chmod u=rw,g=,o= msg traver.lance % ls -l msg -rw------- 1 ld231782 35661 Jan 29 23:13 msg Here the modes on the file `msg' were changed to take away rights from `group' and `other'. Note that `ls -l <file>' requires both the 'r' right to get the list of files and subdirectories, and the 'x' right to access the files and subdirectories in order to get their size, etc. For example, suppose the directory `foo' has rights dr--r--r--, the following is possible: ls foo These commands would fail independent of file rights: ls -l foo ls -l foo/file cat foo/file cd foo If the directory `foo' has rights d--x--x--x, the following are possible if it is known beforehand that `foo' contains an 'r' readable file named `file': ls -l foo/file cat foo/file cd foo The following commands fail: ls foo ls -l foo (Thanks to Uwe Waldmann <uwe@mpi-sb.mpg.de> for contributions here.) _____ <2.6> How (in)secure is X Windows? X Windows is the primary software developed by the MIT Athena project (1983-1991) which was funded by commercial grants primarily from DEC and IBM to develop applications to harness the power of networks in enhancing computational tasks, particularly the human-computer interface. The software implements a client-server interface to a computer via graphical windows. In this case the `client' is the application requesting or utilizing graphical resources (such as windows or a mouse) and the `server' is the machine that provides them. In many situations the client is an application program running on the same machine as the server. The great utility of X Windows comes from its complete dissociation of the client and server so that windows may be `broadcast' to a server at a remote location from the client. Unfortunately this dynamic power also introduces many deep, intricate, and complicated security considerations. The primary security and privacy issue associated with X Windows is that much more sensitive data may be sent over a network, and over wider regions, than in the case where the human is situated near the host computer. Currently there is no encryption of data such as screen updates and keystrokes in X Windows. Due to either intentional design decisions or unintentional design flaws, early versions of the X Window system are extremely insecure (the decision may have been made not to attempt to overcome existing vulnerabiliies in the Unix system). Anyone with an account on the server machine can disrupt that display or read it electronically based on access to the device unix:0.0 by any regular user. There are no protections from this type of access in these versions. The problem arises because the security is completely based on machine addresses rather than users, such that any user at a `trusted' machine is himself trusted. Quoting from X documentation (man Xsecurity): > Any client on a host in the host access control list is allowed > access to the X server. This system can work reasonably well in > an environment where everyone trusts everyone, or when only a > single person can log into a given machine...This system does not > work well when multiple people can log in to a single machine and > mutual trust does not exist. With the access control list, the `xhost' command may prevent some naive attempts (i.e. those other than the direct-access unix:0.0 evasion); the syntax as typed on the host machine is ``xhost +[name]'' where [name] is the domain name or internet address of an authorized client machine. By default clients running nonlocal to the host are disabled. Public domain programs to disrupt a display momentarily (such as 'flip' or slowly mirror the screen image, or cause pixels to 'melt' down to the bottom) have been circulating on the internet among hackers for several years and played as pranks on unsuspecting or inexperienced users. Much more serious security breaches are conceivable from similar mechanisms exploiting this inherent weaknesses. (The minimal, easily-bypassed `trusted' security mode of `xhost' has been jokingly referred to as ``X Hanging Open, Security Terrible.''). New versions of the X Window system (X11R5 and higher) by default make server access as secure as the file system using a .Xauthority file and 'magic cookies'. Remote machines must have a code in the .Xauthority file in the home directory that matches the code allowed by the server. Many older programs and even new vendor-supplied code does not support or is incompatible with `magic cookies'. The basic magic cookie mechanism is vulnerable to monitoring techniques described earlier because no encryption of keys occurs in transmission. X11R5 also includes other sophisticated encryption mechanisms. Try `man Xsecurity' to find out what is supported at your site. Even though improved security mechanisms have been available in X Windows since ~1990, local sites often update this software infrequently because installation is extremely complex. (Thanks to Marc Vanheyningen <mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu>, Jim Mattson <mattson@cs.ucsd.edu>, and Bill Marshall <marshall@cs.iastate.edu> for contributions here.) _____ <2.7> How (in)secure is my email? By default, not very. The characters that you are reading are almost certainly encoded in ASCII, the American Standard Code for Information Interchange that maps alphabetic and symbolic characters onto numeric codes and vice versa. Virtually every computer system uses this code, and if not, has ways of converting to and from it. When you write a mail message, by default it is being sent in ASCII, and since the standard is virtually universal, there is no intrinsic privacy. Despite milleniums worth of accumulated cryptographic knowledge, cryptographic technologies are only recently being established that afford high priority to privacy as a primary criteria in computer and network design. Some potential pitfalls in privacy are as follows: - The most serious threats are instances of immature or unscrupulous system operators reading private mail in the `spool files' at a local site (i.e. at the source or destination of the message), such as a university. - System administrators may also release files to law enforcement agencies, but conventions and protocols for warrants involving computer searches have still not been strongly established and tested legally. - Note that bounced messages go to postmasters at a given site in their entirety. This means that if you address mail with an incorrect address it has a good chance of being seen by a human other than the recipient. - Typically new user accounts are always set up such that the local mail directory is private, but this is not guaranteed and can be overridden. - Finally, be aware that some mailing lists (email addresses of everyone on a list) are actually publicly accessable via mail routing software mechanisms. This `feature' can be disabled. Most potential compromises in email privacy can be thoroughly avoided with the use of strong end-to-end cryptography, which has its own set of caveats (for example, unscrupulous administrators may still be a threat if the encryption site is shared or nonlocal). See the sections on ``email privacy'' and ``email policies.'' _____ <2.8> How am I (not) liable for my email and postings? As punishment or whatever, your system administrator can revoke certain `privileges' such as emailing, USENET posting or reading certain groups, file transferring, remote communications, or generally any subset of capabilities available from your account. This all is completely at the discretion of the local administrator and under the procedures followed at a particular site, which in many cases are haphazard and crisis-oriented. Currently there are virtually no widespread, uniform guidelines or procedures for restricting use to any internet services, and local administrators are free to make arbitrary decisions on access. Today punitive measures are regularly applied in various situations. In the typical scenario complaint(s) reach a system adminstrator regarding abuses by a user, usually but not necessarily preceded by complaints to the user in email, regarding that person's objectionable email or postings. `abusive' posters to USENET are usually first given admonitions from their system administrators as urged by others on the `net'. (The debate persists endlessly on many newsgroups whether this is also used as a questionable means of attacking or silencing `harmless crackpots' or censoring unpopular opinions.) System administrators at remote sites regularly cooperate to 'squelch' severe cases of abuse. In general, however, by tradition Usenet readers are remarkably tolerant of diverse views and uses of the system, but a colorful vocabularly of slang helps describe their alternatives when this patience is sapped: the options wielded by the individual user are to simply advance to the next message (referred to as ``hitting the `n' key''), or to `plonk' annoying posters (according to the Hacker's Dictionary, the sound a jerk makes at the end of a fall to the bottom of a kill file). In cases where punitive actions are applied, generally system administrators are least likely to restrict email. USENET postings are much more commonly restricted, either to individual users or entire groups (such as a university campus). Restrictions are most commonly associated with the following `abuses': - harassing or threatening notes, `email terrorism' - illegal uses, e.g. piracy or propagation of copyrighted material - `ad hominem' attacks, i.e. insulting the reputation of the poster instead of citing the content of the message - intentional or extreme vulgarity and offensiveness - inappropriate postings, esp. binary files in regular groups `mail-bombing': inundating mail boxes with numerous or massive files Major problems originate from lack of distinctions in private and official email or postings. Most users have internet access via accounts at businesses or universities and their activities on the internet can be construed as representative of their parent organizations. Many people put disclaimers in their `signatures' in an attempt dissociate their identity and activities from parent organizations as a precaution. A recent visible political case involves the privacy of electronic mail written by White House staff members of the Bush administration. Following are some guidelines: - Acquaint yourself with your company or university policy. - If possible, avoid use of your company email address for private communication. - Use a disclaimer. - Keep a low profile (avoid `flamewars' or simply don't post). - Avoid posting information that could be construed to be proprietary or `internal'. The following references are available from ftp.eff.com (see also the section on ``internet use policies''): /pub/academic/banned.1991 /pub/academic/banned.1992 --- Computer material that was banned/challenged in academia in 1991 and 1992 including USENET hierarchies. /pub/academic/cases --- This is an on-line collection of information about specific computers and academic freedom cases. File README is a detailed description of the items in the directory. /pub/academic/faq/netnews.liability --- Notes on university liability for Usenet. _____ <2.9> How do I provide more/less information to others on my identity? The public information of your identity and account is mostly available though the UNIX utility `finger' described above. - You have control over most of this information with the utility `chfn', the specifics vary between sites (on some systems use `passwd -f'). - You can provide unlimited information in the .plan file which is copied directly to the destination during the fingering. - A technique that works at some sites allows you to find out who is 'finger'ing you and even to vary the .plan file sent to them. - Your signature is determined by the environment variable SIGNATURE - USENET signatures are conventionally stored in the .signature file in your home directory. Providing less information on your online identity is more difficult and involved. One approach is to ask your system adminstrator to change or delete information about you (such as your full name). You may be able to obtain access on a public account or one from someone unrelated to you personally. You may be able to remotely login (via modem or otherwise) to computers that you are not physically near. These are tactics for hiding or masking your online activities but nothing is foolproof. Consult man pages on the 'chmod' command and the default file mode. Generally, files on a shared system have good safeguards within the user pool but very little protection is possible from corrupt system administrators. To mask your identity in email or on USENET you can use different accounts. More untraceable are new `anonymous posting' and remailing services that are very recently being established. See below. ______ <2.10> Who is my sysadmin? What does s/he know about me? The requirements and screening for getting a system administration job (and thereby access to all information on a system) vary widely between sites and are sometimes frighteningly lax, especially at universities. Many UNIX systems at universities are largely managed by undergraduates with a background in computing and often `hacking'. In general, commercial and industrial sites are more strict on qualifications and background, and government sites are extremely strict. The system adminstrator (root user) can monitor what commands you used and at what times. S/he may have a record (backups) of files on your account over a few weeks. S/he can monitor when you send email or post USENET messages, and potentially read either. S/he may have access to records indicating what hosts you are using, both locally and elsewhere. Administrators sometimes employ specialized programs to track `strange' or `unusual' activity, which can potentially be misused. ______ <2.11> Why is privacy (un)stable on the internet? For the numerous reasons listed above, privacy should not be an expectation with current use of the internet. Furthermore, large parts of the internet are funded by the U.S. NSF (National Science Foundation) which places certain restrictions on its use (such as prohibiting commercial use). Some high-level officials in this and other government agencies may be opposed to emerging techniques to guarantee privacy (such as encryption and anonymous services). Historically the major threats to privacy on the internet have been local. Perhaps the most common example of this are the widespread occurrences of university administrators refusing to carry some portion of USENET newsgroups labelled as `pornographic'. The `alternative' hierarchy in the USENET system, which has virtually no restrictions on propagation and new group creation, is frequently targeted (although this material may appear anywhere). From the global point of view traffic is generally completely unimpeded on the internet and only the most egregious offenders are pursued. For example, verbatim transcriptions of copyrighted material (such as newspaper or magazine articles) are posted to USENET with regularity without major consequences (some email complaints may ensue). More astonishing to some is that currently significant portions of USENET traffic, and less so internet traffic, is comprised of sexually-explicit digitized images almost entirely originating from copyrighted material (newsgroups such as `alt.sex' regularly have the highest traffic). ______ <2.12> What is the future of privacy on the internet? Some argue that the internet currently has an adequate or appropriate level of privacy. Others will argue that as a prototype for future global networks it has woefully inadequate safeguards. The internet is growing to become a completely global, international superhighway for data, and this traffic will inevitably entail data such as voice messages, postal mail, and many other items of extremely personal nature. Computer items that many people consider completely private (such as their local hard drives) will literally be inches from global network connections. Also, sensitive industrial and business information is exchanged over networks currently and this volume may conceivably merge with the internet. Most would agree that, for these basic but sensitive uses of the internet, no significant mechanisms are currently in place to ensure much privacy. New standards are calling for uniform introduction of `privacy enhanced mail' (PEM) which uses encryption technologies to ensure privacy, so that privacy protection is automatic, and may significantly improve safeguards. The same technology that can be extremely destructive to privacy (such as with surreptitious surveilance) can be overwhelmingly effective in protecting it (e.g. with encryption). Some government agencies are opposed to unlimited privacy in general, and believe that it should lawfully be forfeited in cases of criminal conduct (e.g. court-authorized wiretapping). However, powerful new technologies to protect privacy on computers are becoming increasingly popular, provoking some to say that ``the cat is out of the bag'' and the ``genie can't be put back in the bottle''. In less idiomatic terms, they believe that the spread of strong cryptography is already underway will be socially and technically unstoppable. To date, no feasible system that guarantees both secure communication and government oversight has been proposed (the two goals are largely incompatible). Proposals for ``registration'' of secret keys (by D. Denning on sci.crypt, for example) have been met with hot controversy at best and ridicule and derision at worst, mainly because of concerns for the right to privacy and objections of inherent feasibility. Electronic privacy issues, and particularly the proper roles of networks and the internet, will foreseeably become highly visible and explosive over the next few years. ANONYMITY ========= _____ <3.1> What is `anonymity' on the internet? Simply stated, anonymity is the absence of identity, the ultimate in privacy. However, there are several variations on this simple theme. A person may wish to be consistently identified by a certain pseudonym or `handle' and establish a reputation under it in some area, providing pseudo-anonymity. A person may wish to be completely untraceable for a single one-way message (a sort of `hit-and-run'). Or, a person may wish to be openly anonymous but carry on a conversation with others (with either known or anonymous identities) via an `anonymous return address'. A user may wish to appear as a `regular user' but actually be untraceable. Sometimes a user wishes to hide who he is sending mail to (in addition to the message itself). The anonymous item itself may be directed at individuals or groups. A user may wish to access some service and hide all signs of the association. All of these uses are feasible on the internet but are currently tricky to carry out in practice, because of all the tracking mechanisms inherent to operating systems and network protocols. Officials of the NSF and other government agencies may be opposed to any of these uses because of the potential for abuse. Nevertheless, the inherent facelessness of large networks will always guarantee a certain element of anonymity. _____ <3.2> Why is `anonymity' (un)important on the internet? Anonymity is another powerful tool that can be beneficial or problematic depending on its use. Arguably absence of identification is important as the presence of it. It may be the case that many strong benefits from electronic anonymity will be discovered that were unforeseen and unpredicted, because true anonymity has been historically very difficult to establish. One can use anonymity to make personal statements to a colleague that would sabotage a relationship if stated openly (such as employer/employee scenarios). One can use it to pass information and evade any threat of direct retribution. For example, `whistleblowers' reporting on government abuses (economic, social, or political) can bring issues to light without fear of stigma or retaliation. Sensitive, personal, potentially damaging information is often posted to some USENET groups, a risky situation where anonymity allows conversations to be carried on completely independent of the identities of the participants. Some police departments run phone services that allow anonymous reporting of crimes; such uses would be straightforward on the network. Anonymity can be extremely important and potentially lifesaving diagnoses and discussions carried out on medical or theurapeutic newsgroups. Unfortunately, extortion and harassment become more insidious with assurances of anonymity. _____ <3.3> How can anonymity be protected on the internet? The chief means, as alluded to above, are masking identities in email and posting. However, anonymous accounts (public accounts as accessable and anonymous as e.g. public telephones) may be effective as well, but this use is generally not officially supported and even discouraged by some system adminstrators and NSF guidelines. The nonuniformity in the requirements of obtaining accounts at different sites and institutions makes anonymous accounts generally difficult to obtain to the public at large. Many communications protocols are inherently detrimental to anonymity. Virtually every protocol in existence currently contains information on both sender and receiver in every packet. New communications protocols will likely develop that guarantee much higher degrees of secure anonymous communication. _____ <3.4> What is `anonymous mail'? One approach to `anonymizing' mail has been to set up an `anonymous server' that, when activated by email to its address, responds by allocating and supplying an `anonymous ID' that is unique to the person requesting it (based on his email address). This will vary for the same person for different machine address email originations. To send anonymous mail, the user sends email directed to the server containing the final destination. The server `anonymizes' the message by stripping of identification information and forwards the message, which appears to originate from the anonymous server only from the corresponding anonymous user id. This is the `interactive' use of anonymity or pseudonymity mentioned above. Another more `fringe' approach is to run a `cypherpunk' remailer from a regular user account (no root system privileges are required). These are currently being pioneered by Eric Hughes and Hal Finney <hal@alumni.caltech.edu>. The operator runs a process on a machine that anonymizes mail sent to him with certain characteristics that distinguish it from his regular incoming mail (typically fields in the header). One has been implemented as a PERL script running on UNIX. Several of these are in existence currently but sites and software currently are highly unstable; they may be in operation outside of system administrator knowledge. The remailers don't generally support anonymous return addresses. Mail that is incorrectly addressed is received by the operator. Generally the user of the remailer has to disavow any responsibility for the messages forwarded through his system, although actually may be held liable regardless. These approaches have several serious disadvantages and weaknesses: - The anonymous server approach requires maintaining a mapping of anonymous ID's to real addresses that must be maintained indefinitely. One alternative is to allow `deallocation' of aliases at the request of the user, but this has not been implemented yet. - Although an unlikely scenario, traffic to any of these sites could conceivably be monitored from the `outside', necessitating the use of cryptography for basic protection,. - Local administrators can shut them down either out of caprice or under pressure from local, network, or government agencies. - Unscrupulous providers of the services can monitor the traffic that goes through them. - Most remailers currently keep logs that may be inspected. - The cypherpunk approach tends to be highly unstable because these operators are basically network users who do not own the equipment and are accountable to their own system administrators, who may be unaware of the use and unsympathetic to the philosophy of anonymity when the operation is discovered, regarding it as illicit use. - In all cases, a high degree of trust is placed in the anonymous server operator by the user. Currently the most direct route to anonymity involves using SMTP protocols to submit a message directly to a server with arbitrary field information. This practice, not uncommon to hackers, and the approach used by remailers, is generally viewed with hostility by most system administrators. Information in the header routing data and logs of network port connection information may be retained that can be used to track the originating site. In practice, this is generally infeasible and rarely carried out. Some administrators on the network will contact local administrators to request a message be tracked and its writer admonished or punished more severely (such as revoking the account), all of this actually happening occasionally but infrequently. See the sections ``known anonymous mail and posting sites'' and ``responsibilities associated with anonymity''. _____ <3.5> What is `anonymous posting'? Anonymous servers have been established as well for anonymous Usenet posting with all the associated caveats above (monitored traffic, capricious or risky local circumstances, logging). Make sure to test the system at least once by e.g. anonymous posting to misc.test (however some operators don't recommend this because many sites `autorespond' to test messages, possibly causing the anonymous server to allocate anonymous IDs for those machines). See the ``responsibilties associated with anonymous posting'' before proceeding. Another direct route involves using NNTP protocols to submit a message directly to a newserver with arbitrary field information. This practice, not uncommon to hackers, is also generally viewed with hostility by most system administrators, and similar consequences can ensue. See the sections ``known anonymous mail and posting sites'' and ``responsibilities associated with anonymity''. _____ <3.6> Why is anonymity (un)stable on the internet? As noted, many factors compromise the anonymity currently available to the general internet community, and these services should be used with great caution. To summarize, the technology is in its infancy and current approaches are unrefined, unreliable, and not completely trustworthy. No standards have been established and troubling situations of loss of anonymity and bugs in the software are prevalent. Here are some encountered and potential bugs: - One anonymous remailer reallocated already allocated anonymous return addresses. - Others passed signature information embedded in messages unaltered. - Address resolution problems resulting in anonymized mail bounced to a remailer are common. - Forgeries to the anonymous server itself are a problem, possibly allowing unauthorized users to potentially glean anon ID - email address mappings in the alias file. This can be remedied with the use of passwords. - Infinite mail loops are possible with chaining remailers. Source code is being distributed, tested, and refined for these systems, but standards are progressing slowly and weakly. The field is not likely to improve considerably without official endorsement and action by network agencies. The whole idea is essentially still in its infancy and viewed with suspicion and distrust by many on the internet, seen as illegitimate or favorable to criminality. The major objection to anonymity over regular internet use is the perceived lack of accountability to system operators, i.e. invulnerability to account restrictions resulting from outside complaints. System adminstrators at some sites have threatened to filter anonymous news postings generated by the prominent servers from their redistribution flows. This may only have the effect of encouraging server operators to create less characteristically detectable headers. Probably the least problematic approach, and the most traditional to Usenet, is for individual users to deal with anonymous mail however they prefer, e.g. ignoring it or filtering it with kill files. _____ <3.7> What is the future of anonymity on the internet? New anonymous protocols effectively serve to significantly increase safeguards of anonymity. For example, the same mechanism that routes email over multiple hosts, thereby threatening its privacy, can also be used to guarantee it. In a scheme called `chaining' an anonymous message is passed through multiple anonymous servers before reaching a destination. In this way generally multiple links of the chain have to be `broken' for security to be compromised. Re-encryption at each link makes this scenario even more unlikely. Even more significantly the anonymous remailers could be spread over the internet globally so that local weaknesses (such as corrupt governments or legal wiretapping within a nation) would be more unlikely to sacrifice overall security by message tracing. However, remailers run by corrupt operators are possible. The future of anonymous services on the internet is, at this time, highly uncertain and fraught with peril. While specific groups seem to benefit significantly from anonymous posting capabilities, many feel that unlimited newsgroup scope for anonymous posting is a disruptive and dangerous idea and detracts from discussions in `serious' groups. The introduction of unlimited group anonymity may have fundamental repercussions on Usenet conventions and distribution mechanisms such as moderated and `alt' groups have had in the past. For example, as part of new group creation, the charter may specify whether `anonymous' posting is (un)welcome. Nevertheless, the widespread introduction and use of anonymity may be inevitable. Based on traffic statistics, anonymous services are in huge demand. Pervasive and readily available anonymity could carry significant and unforeseen social consequences. However, if its use is continued to be generally regarded as subversive it may be confined to the underground. The ramifications of the widespread introduction of anonymity to Usenet are still largely unknown. It is unclear whether it will provoke signficant amounts of new traffic or, instead of expansion, cause a shift where a greater portion of existing traffic is anonymized. Conceivably the services could play a role in influencing future mainstream social acceptance of Usenet. ISSUES ====== _____ <4.1> What is the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)? From ftp.eff.org:/pub/EFF/mission_statement: > A new world is arising in the vast web of digital, electronic > media which connect us. Computer-based communication media like > electronic mail and computer conferencing are becoming the basis > of new forms of community. These communities without a single, > fixed geographical location comprise the first settlements on an > electronic frontier. > > While well-established legal principles and cultural norms give > structure and coherence to uses of conventional media like > newspapers, books, and telephones, the new digital media do not > so easily fit into existing frameworks. Conflicts come about as > the law struggles to define its application in a context where > fundamental notions of speech, property, and place take > profoundly new forms. People sense both the promise and the > threat inherent in new computer and communications technologies, > even as they struggle to master or simply cope with them in the > workplace and the home. > > The Electronic Frontier Foundation has been established to help > civilize the electronic frontier; to make it truly useful and > beneficial not just to a technical elite, but to everyone; and to > do this in a way which is in keeping with our society's highest > traditions of the free and open flow of information and > communication. EFF was started by the multimillionaire Mitchell Kapor, founder of Lotus software, and John Barlow, lyricist for the Grateful Dead rock band. A highly publicized endeavor of the organization involved the legal defense of Steve Jackson Games after an FBI raid and an accompanying civil suit (see section on ``Steve Jackson Games''). The foundation publishes EFF News (EFFector Online) electronically, send requests to effnews-request@eff.org. In a letter to Mitchell Kapor from the Chairman of the Subcommittee with primary jurisdiction over telecommunications policy dated November 5, 1991, Representative Edward J. Markey complemented Mitchell Kapor on his ``insights on the development of a national public information infrastructure'' which ``were appreciated greatly by myself and the Members of the Subcommittee'' (complete text in ftp.eff.com:/pub/pub-infra/1991-12): > ...we need to pursue policies that encourage the Bell companies to > work with other sectors of the communications industry to create > a consumer-oriented, public information network. Please let me or > my staff know what policies you and others in the computer > industry believe would best serve the public interest in creating > a reasonably priced, widely available network in which > competition is open and innovation rewarded. I also want to > learn what lessons from the computer industry over the past ten > to fifteen years should apply to the current debate on > structuring the information and communications networks of the > future....I ask your help in gaining input from the computer > industry so that the Subcommittee can shape policies that will > bring this spirit of innovation and entrepreneurship to the > information services industry. ftp.eff.org =========== /pub/eff/about-eff --- A file of basic information about EFF including goals, mission, achievements, and current projects. Contains a membership form. /pub/eff/mission-statement --- EFF mission statement. /pub/eff/historical/founding-announcement --- EFF founding press release. /pub/eff/historical/eff-history --- John Perry Barlow's ``Not Terribly Brief History of the EFF'' (July 10, 1990). How EFF was conceived and founded, major legal cases, and the organizational directions. /pub/eff/historical/legal-case-summary --- EFF legal case summary. _____ <4.2> Who are Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR)? The Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility have been working to protect and promote electronic civil liberties issues since ~1982. The group has three offices (Palo Alto, Cambridge, Washington, DC) and 20 chapters. It is involved in litigation against the FBI, The NSA, NIST, the Secret Service and other other U.S. government agencies to declassify and provide documentation on issues such as Operation Sundevil, the FBI wiretap proposal, NSA's interference in crypography, the breakup of the 2600 raid in Arlington, Va in Nov 1992. Members speak frequently in front on Congress, state legislators and public utility commissions to testify on privacy, information policy, computer security, and caller identification. CPSR has created an extensive Internet Privacy library available via FTP, Gopher, WAIS, and email at cpsr.org, currently comprising the largest collection of privacy documents on the internet. For more information, anonymous FTP cpsr.org:/cpsr/. (Thanks to Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org> for contributions here.) _____ <4.3> What was `Operation Sundevil' and the Steve Jackson Game case? In the early 1990's a fear spread among U.S. law enforcement agencies on the illicit activities of `hackers' and `phreakers' involved in such activities as computer tampering via modem, credit card fraud, and long-distance call thievery. (Descriptions of real `hacking' exploits can be found in the book Cyberpunk by J. Markoff and K. Hafner.) See ftp.eff.org:/pub/SJG/General_Information/EFFector1.04: > `Operation Sundevil,' the Phoenix-inspired crackdown of May > 8,1990, concentrated on telephone code-fraud and credit-card > abuse, and followed this seizure plan with some success. > [Bulletin Board Systems] went down all over America, terrifying > the underground and swiftly depriving them of at least some of > their criminal instruments. It also saddled analysts with some > 24,000 floppy disks, and confronted harried Justice Department > prosecutors with the daunting challenge of a gigantic nationwide > hacker show-trial involving highly technical issues in dozens of > jurisdictions. Massive `show-trials' never materialized, although isolated instances of prosecution were pursued. The movement reached a crescendo in Texas with the highly publicized case of illegal search and seizure involving the Steve Jackson Games company of Austin Texas on March 1, 1990. From the column GURPS' LABOUR LOST by Bruce Sterling <bruces@well.sf.ca.us> in Fantasy and Science Fiction Magazine: > In an early morning raid with an unlawful and unconstitutional > warrant, agents of the Secret Service conducted a search of the > SJG office. When they left they took a manuscript being prepared > for publication, private electronic mail, and several computers, > including the hardware and software of the SJG Computer Bulletin > Board System. Yet Jackson and his business were not only > innocent of any crime, but never suspects in the first place. > The raid had been staged on the unfounded suspicion that > somewhere in Jackson's office there `might be' a document > compromising the security of the 911 telephone system. (A detailed and vivid account of the seizure is documented in the book ``The Hacker Crackdown'' by Bruce Sterling.) FBI agents involved in the seizure were named in a civil suit filed on behalf of Steve Jackson Games by The Electronic Frontier Foundation. See information on EFF below. From an article by Joe Abernathy in the Houston Chronicle ~Feb 1, 1993: > AUSTIN -- An electronic civil rights case against the Secret > Service closed Thursday with a clear statement by federal > District Judge Sam Sparks that the Service failed to conduct a > proper investigation in a notorious computer crime crackdown, > and went too far in retaining custody of seized equipment. > > Secret Service Special Agent Timothy Foley of Chicago, who was in > charge of three Austin computer search-and-seizures on March 1, > 1990, that led to the lawsuit, stoically endured Spark's rebuke > over the Service's poor investigation and abusive computer > seizure policies. While the Service has seized dozens of > computers since the crackdown began in 1990, this is the first > case to challenge the practice. > > Sparks grew visibly angry when it was established that the Austin > science fiction magazine and game book publisher was never > suspected of a crime, and that agents did not do even marginal > research to establish a criminal connection between the firm and > the suspected illegal activities of an employee, or to determine > that the company was a publisher. Indeed, agents testified that > they were not even trained in the Privacy Protection Act at the > special Secret Service school on computer crime. > > "How long would it have taken you, Mr. Foley, to find out what > Steve Jackson Games did, what it was?" asked Sparks. "An hour? > > "Was there any reason why, on March 2, you could not return to > Steve Jackson Games a copy, in floppy disk form, of everything > taken? > > "Did you read the article in Business Week magazine where it had > a picture of Steve Jackson -- a law-abiding, tax-paying citizen > -- saying he was a computer crime suspect? > > "Did it ever occur to you, Mr. Foley, that seizing this material > could harm Steve Jackson economically?" > > Foley replied, "No, sir," but the judge offered his own answer. > > "You actually did, you just had no idea anybody would actually go > out and hire a lawyer and sue you." > > More than $200,000 has been spent by the Electronic Frontier > Foundation in bringing the case to trial. The EFF was founded by > Mitchell Kapor amid a civil liberties movement sparked in large > part by the Secret Service computer crime crackdown. The trial is now recognized as a legal precedent explicitly guaranteeing protection of electronically stored information under the Privacy Protection Act, and safeguarding bulletin boards and electronic mail by federal wiretap laws limiting government surveillance powers. See the Wall Street Journal, 3/18/93, p. B1, ``Ruling Gives Privacy a High-Tech Edge'' ftp.eff.org =========== /pub/cud/papers/sundevil --- A collection of information on Operation SunDevil by the Epic nonprofit publishing project. Everything you wanted to know but could never find. /pub/cud/papers/sj-resp --- Steve Jackson's response to the charges against him. _____ <4.4> What is Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN)? ISDN is a high-speed data communications standard that utilizes existing copper telephone lines, and is a possible inexpensive and intermediate alternative to laying fiber optic cable for phone networks. The speeds involved may be sufficient for audio and video transmission applications. G. V. der Leun in the file ftp.eff.org: /pub/pub-infra/1991-11: > Telecommunications in the United States is at a crossroads. With > the Regional Bell Operating Companies now free to provide > content, the shape of the information networking is about to be > irrevocably altered. But will that network be the open, > accessible, affordable network that the American public needs? > You can help decide this question. > > The Electronic Frontier Foundation recently presented a plan to > Congress calling for the immediate deployment of a national > network based on existing ISDN technology, accessible to anyone > with a telephone connection, and priced like local voice service. > We believe deployment of such a platform will spur the > development of innovative new information services, and maximize > freedom, competitiveness, and civil liberties throughout the > nation. > > The EFF is testifying before Congress and the FCC; making > presentations to public utility commisions from Massachusetts to > California; and meeting with representatives from telephone > companies, publishers, consumer advocates, and other stakeholders > in the telecommunications policy debate. > > The EFF believes that participants on the Internet, as pioneers on > the electronic frontier, need to have their voices heard at this > critical moment. To automatically receive a description of the platform and details, send mail to archive-server@eff.org, with the following line: send documents open-platform-overview or send mail to eff@eff.org. See also the Introduction to the EFF Open Platform Proposal in ftp.eff.org:/pub/pub-infra/1991-02. References ========== ``Digital Data On Demand.'' MacWorld, 2/82 (page 224). --- 56Kbps vs. ISDN services and products. See comments by J. Powers in ftp.eff.org:pub/pub-infra/1992-02. ``Telephone Service That Rings of the Future.'' By Joshua Quittner. Newsday, Tue, Jan 7 1992. --- Implications of ISDN for the masses, written in popular science style. John Perry Barlow (cofounder EFF). Regional telephone companies (Ohio Bell). ISDN as ``Technological Rorschach Test.'' Anecdotes about McDonald's, Barbara Bush teleconferencing. See complete text in ftp.eff.org:/pub/pub-infra/1992-01. ftp.eff.org:/pub/pub-infra/ --- Files 1991-11 through 1992-05 containing email from the EFF public infrastructure group organized by month. Opinions and facts on the pros and cons of ISDN, Integrated Services Digital Network. Uses of ISDN (phone video, audio, etc.) Japanese model. Alternatives to ISDN (HDSL, ADSL, fiber optics). Technical specifications of ISDN, implementation details, cost issues, political obstacles, (RBOC, Regional Bell Operating Companies or `Baby Bells', e.g. NET, New England Telephone). Influencing development of future networks (e.g. ISDN and NREN, National Research and Education Network), encouraging competition (cable TV systems). Press releases and news articles. Letter from Rep. E. J. Markey to M. Kapor. _____ <4.5> What is the National Research and Education Network (NREN)? The Nation Research and Education Network was introduced in legislation cosponsored by Sen. A. Gore to promote high-speed data network infrastructure augmenting the internet with up to 50 times faster transmission rates. The bill passed the House on November 20, 1991, the Senate on November 22, 1991, and was signed by the President on December 9, 1991. ftp.eff.org =========== /pub/EFF/legislation/nren-bill-text --- The complete text of the House-Senate compromise version of S. 272, the High-Performance Computing Act. /pub/internet-info/gore.bill --- 102nd congress 1st Session. Text of high performance computing bill cosponsored by Sen. A. Gore. /pub/EFF/legislation/gore-infrastructure-bill --- The text of S.2937, the Information Infrastructure and Technology Act of 1992 introduced by Senator Gore to expand Federal efforts to develop technologies for applications of high-performance computing and high-speed networking, and to provide for a coordinated Federal program to accelerate development and deployment of an advanced information infrastructure. U.S. SAID TO PLAY FAVORITES IN PROMOTING NATIONWIDE COMPUTER NETWORK By John Markoff, N.Y. Times (~18 Dec 91). --- President Bush's legislation for natiowide computer data `superhighway.' IBM-MCI venture as monopoly destructive to fair competition and innovation? National Science Foundation NSFnet. complete text in /pub/pub-infra/1991-12. Commentary ========== /pub/academic/statements/nren.privacy.cpsr --- ``Proposed Privacy Guidelines for the NREN'' -- Statement of Marc Rotenberg, Washington Director Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR). /pub/internet-info/cisler.nren --- The National Research and Education Network: Two meetings Steve Cisler, Senior Scientist Apple Computer Library December 17, 1990 Summary of meetings exploring educational issues of NREN by diverse members of academia and industry. /pub/internet-info/privatized.nren --- Feb. 14 1991 essay by M. Kapor advocating advantages of a private National Public Network, and specific recommendations for open NREN policies encouraging competition. /pub/eff/papers/netproposition --- An FYI about the proposed NREN setup. _____ <4.6> What is the FBI's proposed Digital Telephony Act? ``Providers of electronic communication services and private branch exchange operators shall provide within the United States capability and capacity for the government to intercept wire and electronic communications when authorized by law...'' From `BBS Legislative Watch: FBIs Wiretapping Proposal Thwarted' by S. Steele in Boardwatch Magazine, Feb. 1993, p. 19-22: > In a move that worried privacy experts, software manufacturers and > telephone companies, the FBI proposed legislation to amend the > Communications Act of 1934 to make it easier for the Bureau to > perform electronic wiretapping. The proposed legislation, > entitled 'Digital Telephony,' would have required communications > service providers and hardware manufacturers to make their > systems 'tappable' by providing 'back doors' through which law > enforcement officers could intercept communications. Furthermore, > this capability would have been provided undetectably, while the > communications was in progress, exclusive of any communications > between other parties, regardless of the mobility of the target > of the FBI's investigation, and without degradation of service. > > ...under the proposal, the Department of Justice (DOJ) can keep > communications products off the market if it determines that > these products do not meet the DOJ's own ... guidelines. This > [could] result in increased costs and reduced competitiveness for > service providers and equipment manufacturers, since they will be > unlikely to add any features that may result in a DOJ rejection > of their entire product. ...the FBI proposal suggests that the > cost of this wiretapping 'service' to the Bureau would have to be > borne by the service provider itself... > > The Electronic Frontier Foundation organized a broad coalition of > public interest and industry groups, from Computer Professionals > for Social Responsibilty (CPSR) and the ACLU to AT&T and Sun > Microsystems, to oppose the legislation. A white paper produced > by the EFF and ratified by the coalition, entitled, `An Analysis > of the FBI Digital Telephony Proposal,' was widely distributed > throughout the Congress. ... The Justice Department lobbied hard > in the final days to get Congress to take up the bill before > Congress adjourned, but the bill never ... found a Congressional > sponsor (and was therefore never officially introduced). The FBI > [may] reintroduce "Digital Telephony" when the 103rd Congress > convenes in January. ftp.eff.org =========== /pub/eff/legislation/fbi-wiretap-bill /pub/EFF/legislation/new-fbi-wiretap-bill --- A bill to ensure the continuing access of law enforcement to the content of wire and electronic communications when authorized by law and for other purposes. Version 2 of the bill after FBI changes in response to public response. /pub/cud/law/hr3515 --- House of Rep bill 3515, Telecommunications Law. Commentary ========== /pub/eff/papers/eff-fbi-analysis --- The EFF-sponsored analysis of the FBI's Digital Telephony proposal. /pub/eff/papers/ecpa.layman --- The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986: A Layman's View. /pub/eff/papers/nightline-wire --- Transcript of ABC's Nightline of May 22, 1992, on the FBI, Privacy, and Proposed Wire-Tapping Legislation. Featured are Marc Rotenberg of the CPSR and William Sessions, Director of the FBI. /pub/eff/papers/edwards_letter --- A letter from the Director of the Secret Service to US Rep. Don Edwards, D-California, in response to questions raised by Edwards' Subcommittee. This copy came from Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility in Washington, D.C. /pub/eff/papers/fbi.systems --- A description of how information is stored on the FBI's computer systems. _____ <4.7> What is U.S. policy on freedom/restriction of strong encryption? The Clipper announcement says ``we [the Clinton Administration] understand the importance of encryption technology in telecommunications and computing'' and specifically addresses the question, ``would the Administration be willing to use legal remedies to restrict access to more powerful encryption devices?'' It states that ``The U.S. [is not] saying that `every American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product' '' although currently ``the Administration is not saying, `since [strong] encryption threatens the public safety and effective law enforcement, we will prohibit it outright' as some countries have effectively done.'' However, currently no U.S. laws regulate domestic cryptography use, although the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations classify cryptographic devices as `munitions' and regulate export. _____ <4.8> What other U.S. legislation is related to privacy? ftp.eff.org =========== /pub/cud/law/<state> --- State computer crime laws: AL, AK, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA, HI, IA, ID, IL, IN, MD, MN, NC, NJ, NM, NY, OR, TX, VT, VA, WA, WI, WV. /pub/cud/law/<country> --- Current computer crime laws for: The United States (federal code), Canada, Ghana, and Great Britain. /pub/cud/law/bill.s.618 --- Senate bill 618, addressing registration of encryption keys with the government. /pub/cud/law/improve --- Improvement of Information Access bill. /pub/cud/law/monitoring --- Senate bill 516; concerning abuses of electronic monitoring in the workplace. /pub/cud/law/us.e-privacy --- Title 18, relating to computer crime & email privacy. /pub/academic/law/privacy.electronic.bill --- The text of Simon's electronic privacy bill, S. 516. ``To prevent potential abuses of electronic monitoring in the workplace.'' _____ <4.9> What are references on rights in cyberspace? ftp.eff.org =========== /pub/cud/papers/const.in.cyberspace --- Laurence Tribe's keynote address at the first Conference on Computers, Freedom, & Privacy. `The Constitution in Cyberspace' /pub/cud/papers/denning --- Paper presented to 13th Nat'l Comp Security Conf ``Concerning Hackers Who Break into Computer Systems'' by Dorothy E Denning. /pub/cud/papers/privacy --- ``Computer Privacy vs First and Fourth Amendment Rights'' by Michael S. Borella /pub/cud/papers/rights-of-expr --- Rights of Expression in Cyberspace by R. E. Baird /pub/academic/eff.rights --- Bill of Rights' meaning in the Electronic Frontier. _____ <4.10> What is the Computers and Academic Freedom (CAF) archive? The CAF Archive is an electronic library of information about computers and academic freedom. run by the Computers and Academic Freedom group on the Electronic Frontier Foundation FTP site. > If you have gopher, the archive is browsable with the command: > gopher -p academic gopher.eff.org > > It is available via anonymous ftp to ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in > directory `pub/academic'. It is also available via email. For > information on email access send email to archive-server@eff.org. > In the body of your note include the lines `help' and `index'. > > For more information, to make contributions, or to report typos > contact J.S. Greenfield (greeny@eff.org). ftp.eff.org =========== /pub/academic/statements/caf-statement --- Codifies the application of academic freedom to academic computers, reflecting seven months of on-line discussion about computers and academic freedom. Covers free expression, due process, privacy, and user participation. /pub/academic/books --- Directory of book references related to Computers and Academic Freedom or mentioned in the CAF discussion. The file books/README is a bibliography. /pub/academic/faq/archive --- List of files available on the Computers and Academic Freedom archive. /pub/academic/news --- Directory of all issues of the Computers and Academic Freedom News. A full list of abstracts is available in file `abstracts'. The special best-of-the-month issues are named with their month, for example, `June'. CLIPPER ======= _____ <5.1> What is the Clipper Chip Initiative? On April 16, 1993 the Clinton Administration announced the Clipper Chip Directive in a saturated publicity effort (including postings to Usenet newsgroups by NIST) that introduced the technology and `proposal' that had been developed in strict secrecy prior to that date. The `initiative' introduced the Clipper Chip, a high-speed and `high-security' encryption device with applications in telephones and other network devices, and the government commitment to installing it in future select government telephones with potentially much more widespread penetration (e.g. NREN, commercial telephones, computers, etc.). The voluntary program seeks to unite the federal government and private industry ``to improve the security and privacy of telephone communications while meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement'' by use of the chip. Critical aspects of the directive: - ``A state-of-the-art microcircuit called the `Clipper Chip' has been developed by government engineers'', for use in phones with more power than many commercial encryption devices currently available. ``The key escrow mechanism will provide Americans with an encryption product that is more secure, more convenient, and less expensive than others readily available today.'' - The technology seeks to ``help companies protect proprietary information, protect the privacy of personal phone conversations and prevent unauthorized release of data transmitted electronically'' while preserving ``the ability of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to intercept lawfully the phone conversations of criminals''. - ``A "key-escrow" system will be established to ensure that the "Clipper Chip" is used to protect the privacy of law-abiding Americans.'' Keys are released from the escrow agencies to ``government officials with legal authorization to conduct a wiretap.'' - ``The two key-escrow data banks will be run by two independent entities. At this point, the Department of Justice and the Administration have yet to determine which agencies will oversee the key-escrow data banks.'' - ``The Attorney General will soon purchase several thousand of the new devices.'' to ``demonstrate the effectiveness of this new technology.'' - `Clipper Chip' technology provides law enforcement with ``no new authorities to access the content of the private conversations of Americans''. - The Clipper decision was developed and sanctioned by The National Security Council, the Justice Department, the Commerce Department, and ``other key agencies''. ``This approach has been endorsed by the President, the Vice President, and appropriate Cabinet officials.'' _____ <5.2> How does Clipper blunt `cryptography's dual-edge sword'? The Clipper wiretapping initiative refers to `tension between economic vitality and the real challenges of protecting Americans' and `previous policies [that] have pitted government against industry and the rights of privacy against law enforcement.' The Clipper Initiative attempts to find a compromise in encryption's ``dual-edge sword'' wherein it ``helps to protect the privacy of individuals and industry, but it also can shield criminals and terrorists.'' ``The Administration is committed to policies that protect all Americans' right to privacy while also protecting them from those who break the law.'' The statement notes that sophisticated encryption technology is increasingly being used by Americans to ``protect business secrets and the unauthorized release of personal information'' but also ``by terrorists, drug dealers, and other criminals.'' and declares that ``We need the "Clipper Chip" and other approaches that can both provide law-abiding citizens with access to the encryption they need and prevent criminals from using it to hide their illegal activities.'' Regarding privacy via encryption vs. wiretapping, the Clipper announces: ``There is a false `tension' created in the assessment that this issue is an "either-or" proposition. Rather, both concerns can be, and in fact are, harmoniously balanced through a reasoned, balanced approach such as is proposed with the "Clipper Chip" and similar encryption techniques.'' _____ <5.3> Why are technical details of the Clipper chip being kept secret? - The algorithm will ``remain classified'' to ``protect the security of the key escrow system.'' - ``Respected experts from outside the government will be offered access to the confidential details of the algorithm to assess its capabilities and publicly report their findings.'' - ``We are willing to invite an independent panel of cryptography experts to evaluate the algorithm to assure all potential users that there are no unrecognized vulnerabilities.'' _____ <5.4> Who was consulted in the development of the Clipper chip? - ``The President has directed early and frequent consultations with affected industries, the Congress and groups that advocate the privacy rights of individuals.'' - ``We have briefed members of Congress and industry leaders on the decisions related to this initiative'' and ``expect those discussions to intensify''. _____ <5.5> How is commerical use/export of Clipper chips regulated? - ``Q. How do I buy one of these encryption devices? A. We expect several manufacturers to consider incorporating the "Clipper Chip" into their devices.'' - ``The government designed and developed the key access encryption microcircuits, but ... product manufacturers ... [buy] the microcircuits from the chip manufacturer [Mykotronx] that produces them.'' - The chip's (unspecified) `programming function' ``could be licensed to other vendors in the future.'' Also, ``We plan to review the possibility of permitting wider exportability of these products.'' - ``Case-by-case review for each export is required to ensure appropriate use of these devices'' fitting in with the existing program for review of ``other encryption devices.'' ``We expect export licenses will be granted on a case-by-case basis for U.S. companies. _____ <5.6> What are references on the Clipper Chip? - ``Government picks affordable chip to scramble phone calls.'' By Frank J. Murray. The Washington Times, April 17, 1993 Saturday, Final Edition. > President Clinton gave a major boost yesterday to one telephone- > scrambler technology in a decision its delighted manufacture > likens to the choice of VHS over Beta for videotape machines. > > An administration official said the consideration will be given > to banning more sophisticated systems investigators cannot > crack, thereby creating a balance between banning private > encryption and declaring a public right to unbreakably coded > coversations. - ``Computer Group, Libertarians Question Clinton Phone Privacy Stance.'' By Rory J. O'Connor, San Jose Mercury News, Calif. Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, ~Apr. 17 1993. > SAN JOSE, Calif.--Apr. 17--Civil libertarians and a major > computer industry group raised concerns Friday about how much > protection a Clinton administration plan would afford private > electronic communications, from cellular telephone calls to > computer data. > > "I don't want to sound too stridently opposed to this," said Ken > Wasch, executive director of the Software Publishers > Association (SPA) in Washington. "But...we feel blindsided." > > American Telephone & Telegraph Co. announced Friday it would > adapt the $1,200 product, called the Telephone Security Device, > to use the Clipper Chip by the end of this fiscal quarter. AT&T > makes a related device, which encrypts voice and computer data > transmissions, that could be converted to the Clipper > technology, said spokesman Bill Jones. > > VLSI, which invented a manufacturing method the company said > makes it difficult to "reverse engineer" the chip or discern > the encryption scheme, expects to make $50 million in the next > three years selling the device, said Jeff Hendy, director of > new product marketing for the company. - ``New Scrambler Designed to Protect Privacy, But Allow Police Monitoring.'' By Christopher Drew, Chicago Tribune. Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, ~Apr. 19, 1993. > WASHINGTON--Apr. 19--As a step toward the development of vast > new data "superhighways," the federal government has designed a > powerful device that would protect the privacy of electronic > communications by encoding them but still allow police to > eavesdrop. > > "'A.k.a. Big Brother,' that's what I call it," said Stephen > Bryen, a former Pentagon official who runs a company developing > a rival encryption system. > > Bryen said it was "very disturbing" that the government has gone > so far with the previously classified project "without > consulting with experts in the industry" whose investments > could be wiped out. > > To spur the venture, the Justice Department will soon purchase > several thousand of the devices. Military and spy agencies also > are expected to use them. - ``US reveals computer chip for scrambling telephones.'' By John Mintz. Washington Post, April, 17 1993. > WASHINGTON -- The White House yesterday announced its new plan > to prevent criminals, terrorists, and industrial spies from > decoding communications over telephones, fax machines, and > computers while ensuring the government's ability to eavesdrop. > > The official White House announcement yesterday was the > endorsement of the Clipper Chip, developed by NSA, as the > government standard for encryption devices. - ``Clinton security plan hints of Big Brother: Clipper Chip would let governemnt eavesdrop on encrypted voice and data communications.'' By Ellen Messmer. Network World, April 19, 1993. > But government officials had a difficult time last week > rebutting the question why any criminal would use a Clipper > Chip-based product when the person knows the government could > listen in, particularly since there are a host of other > encryption products available on the market that are, in > theory, unbreakable codes. > > "A criminal probably wouldn't use it," said Mike Agee, marketing > manager for secure products at AT&T, adding that the Clipper > Chip is for the rest of the world. For additional details, call Mat Heyman, National Institute of Standards and Technology, (301) 975-2758. _____ <5.7> What are compliments/criticisms of the Clipper chip? Compliments ---------- - Chip may protect the law abiding citizen's privacy from the casual snooper. - Potentially sophisticated and superior algorithm endorsed by the NSA. - May establish a new standard whereby companies may be able to come up with competing pin-compatible chips. - Potential for encrypting `on top' of the Clipper algorithm. - May allow diverse law enforcement agency's to retain wiretapping ability without serious or impossible obstacles. - May enable broad new traffic analysis by law enforcement agencies. Criticisms ---------- - Algorithm designed exclusively by the NSA with biased interests. - Possibly unsophisticated, inferior, or more costly in comparison with current or emerging technology. - Compromised keys retroactively weaken all communication ever sent over the device. - Key generation techniques are `baroque activities in a vault': suspicious and unrealistic-sounding. - Impossible to ensure secrecy of a chip in the face of today's technology and inevitable intense independent inquiry and scrutiny, and dependence on it weakens security. - No specific assurance that key generation is impartial and safe. - Secrecy of the algorithm prevents serious inquiry and sabotages trust in the algorithm. No guarantee against `back door'. _____ <5.8> What are compliments/criticisms of the Clipper Initiative? Compliments ----------- - Brings privacy and encryption issues into the limelight. - Sharpens the public debate on the role, extent, and legitimacy of wiretapping practices. - Exposes previously concealed high-level agenda in U.S. government to manage cryptographic technology. - Potential new option for individuals and companies interested in protecting privacy. - Suggests Clinton administration has strong interest in technology, reaching compromises, and encouraging competitiveness. Criticisms ---------- - Evasion of critical aspects (such as key agencies) and preoccupation with others (references to criminals) ``begs the question'' of inherent public desireability and support of plan. - Legality within framework of paramount constitutional guarantees on freedom of speech and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure wholly unaddressed. - Unilaterally imposed, i.e. no involvement from the parties it purports to represent. - Funded with taxpayer money with no meaningful public oversight and scrutiny. - Represents a fundamental switch in the government's role in wiretapping from passive to active. - Potentially criminals won't use the technology and will easily evade it, while law-abiding citizens will be inconvenienced and/or sacrifice rights. - Does not protect the individual from corrupt government officials. - Secrecy of the algorithm may amount to `security through obscurity,' i.e. the algorithm security may rely on aspects of chip operation staying confidential and undiscovered. - Government appears to be colluding with private companies and using leverage to intentionally create a monopoly. - Possibility of taxpayer funds effectively subsidizing chip sales not addressed. - Secrecy of the chip design prevents inquiries into its precise security. - ``government engineers'' in competition with private industries, with special favoritism in policies of the Clinton administration. - may require new vast and superfluous government bureacracies. _____ <5.9> What are compliments/criticisms of the Clipper announcement? Compliments ----------- - Shows unequivocal commitment to wiretapping drug dealers, criminals, and terrorists. - Publicizes previously secret development and processes regarding Clipper in particular and cryptography in general. - Well publicized within some circles. Usenet press release unprecedented and sophisticated. - Shows Clinton administration commitment to developing national policies on `information infrastructure' and the intrinsic role of encryption technology. - Masterpiece of propaganda for study by future generations. Criticisms ---------- - States that Clipper is better than many encryption technologies available today but does not indicate that many are recognized to be weak and new and more powerful technologies are already under development. - Vague on critical aspects such as who the key escrow agencies are. - Appears to assume that Americans wish to preserve wiretapping capabilities by law enforcement agencies in the face of new unbreakable encryption technologies. - Specifically does not commit to freedom of encryption and hints that failure of Clipper-style approaches may lead to restrictions on strong cryptography. - Gives the impression that Congress and private industry was involved when their participation is minimal to nonexistent. - Authoritarian, dictatorial, and Orwellian undertones. - Evades mention of the NSA's specific involvement. - Refers to the chip as `state of the art' without evidence. - Refers to ``drug dealers, criminals, and terrorists'' with terms such as `alleged,' `suspected,' `reputed,' and `accused' conspicuously absent. - Does not specifically commit to unrestrained public policy review and appears to evade it. - Evades mention of the history of the plan and erroneously implies that Clinton administration involvement is primary. _____ <5.10> Where does Clipper fit in U.S. cryptographic technology policy? The Clipper chip is part of a large-scale plan that involves ``the creation of new products to accelerate the development and use of advanced and secure telecommunications networks and wireless communications links'' utilizing the chip. - ``we [of the Clinton Administration] understand the importance of encryption technology in telecommunications and computing and are committed to working with industry and public-interest groups to find innovative ways to protect Americans' privacy, help businesses to compete, and ensure that law enforcement agencies have the tools they need to fight crime and terrorism.'' - ``The President has directed government agencies to develop a comprehensive policy on encryption'' and ``explore new approaches like the key-escrow system'' which ``is just one piece of what must be the comprehensive approach to encryption technology, which the Administration is developing.'' - The `broad policy review' will also address the role of cryptography in ``the development of a National Information Infrastructure or `information superhighways''' and consider ``the need of U.S. companies to manufacture and export high technology products.'' - ``The Federal Government must act quickly to develop consistent, comprehensive policies regarding its use'' and ``as we carry out our review of encryption policy'' the ``on-going discussions with Congress and industry on encryption issues'' are expected to ``intensify.'' RESOURCES ========= _____ <6.1> What UNIX programs are related to privacy? For more information, type `man [cmd]' or `apropos [keyword]' at the UNIX shell prompt. passwd - change password finger - obtain information about a remote user chfn - change information about yourself obtainable by remote users (sometimes `passwd -f') chmod - change the rights associated with a file or directory umask - (shell) change the default (on creation) file access rights ls - list the rights associated with files and directories xhost - allow or disable access control of particular users to an Xwindow server last - list the latest user logins on the system and their originations who - list other users, login/idle times, originations w - list other users and what they are running xhost - access control list for X Window client use xauth - control X Window server authentication .signature - file in the home directory appended to USENET posts .forward - file used to forward email to other accounts .Xauthority - file used for X Window server authentication keys $SIGNATURE - variable used for name in email and USENET postings The 'tcpdump' packet-tracing program is loosely based on SMI's "etherfind". It was originally written by Van Jacobson, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, as part of an ongoing research project to investigate and improve tcp and internet gateway performance. A current version is available via anonymous ftp from host ftp.ee.lbl.gov (currently at address 128.3.254.68) file tcpdump.tar.Z (a compressed Unix tar file). _____ <6.2> How can I learn about or use cryptography? A general introduction to mostly theoretical cryptographic issues, especially those frequently discussed in sci.crypt, is available in FAQ form: > Compiled by: > cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) > Gwyn@BRL.MIL (Doug Gwyn) > smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin) NIST (U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology) publishes an introductory paper on cryptography, special publication 800-2 ``Public-Key Cryptograhy'' by James Nechvatal (April 1991). Available via anonymous FTP from csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (129.6.54.11), file pub/nistpubs/800-2.txt. Also via available anonymous FTP from wimsey.bc.ca as crypt.txt.Z in the crypto directory. Covers technical mathematical aspects of encryption such as number theory. More general information can be found in a FAQ by Paul Fahn of RSA Labortories via anonymous FTP from rsa.com in /pub/faq.ps.Z. See the `readme' file for information on the `tex' version. Also available as hardcopy for $20 from RSA Laboratories, 100 Marine Parkway, Redwood City, CA 94065. Send questions to faq-editor@rsa.com. Phil Zimmerman's PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) package for public key encryption is available at numerous sites, and is in widespread use over the internet for general PC-, Macintosh-, and UNIX-based file encryption (including email). Consult the archie FTP database. Also see the newsgroup alt.security.pgp. Mailing list requests to info-pgp-request@lucpul.it.luc.edu. From the RIPEM FAQ by Marc VanHeyningen <mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu> on news.answers: > RIPEM is a program which performs Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) > using the cryptographic techniques of RSA and DES. It allows > your electronic mail to have the properties of authentication > (i.e. who sent it can be confirmed) and privacy (i.e. nobody can > read it except the intended recipient.) > > RIPEM was written primarily by Mark Riordan > <mrr@scss3.cl.msu.edu>. Most of the code is in the public domain, > except for the RSA routines, which are a library called RSAREF > licensed from RSA Data Security Inc. > > RIPEM is available via anonymous FTP to citizens and permanent > residents in the U.S. from rsa.com; cd to rsaref/ and read the > README file for info. > > RIPEM, as well as some other crypt stuff, has its `home site' on > rpub.cl.msu.edu, which is open to non-anonymous FTP for users in > the U.S. and Canada who are citizens or permanent residents. To > find out how to obtain access, ftp there, cd to pub/crypt/, and > read the file GETTING_ACCESS. Note: cryptography is generally not well integrated into email yet and some system proficiency is required by users to utilize it. _____ <6.3> What is the cypherpunks mailing list? Eric Hughes <hughes@toad.com> runs the `cypherpunk' mailing list dedicated to ``discussion about technological defenses for privacy in the digital domain.'' Send email to cypherpunks-request@toad.com to be added or subtracted from the list. From the charter: > The most important means to the defense of privacy is encryption. > To encrypt is to indicate the desire for privacy. But to encrypt > with weak cryptography is to indicate not too much desire for > privacy. Cypherpunks hope that all people desiring privacy will > learn how best to defend it. _____ <6.4> What are some privacy-related newsgroups? FAQs? Newsgroups ========== alt.comp.acad-freedom.news alt.comp.acad-freedom.talk -------------------------- Moderated and unmoderated issues related to academic freedom and privacy at universities. Documented examples of violated privacy in e.g. email. Documented examples of `censorship' as in e.g. limiting USENET groups local availability. alt.cyberpunk ------------- Virtual reality, (science) fiction by William Gibson and Bruce Sterling, cyberpunk in the mainstream. alt.hackers ----------- USENET Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP) posting mechanisms, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), `obligatory hack' reports. alt.privacy ----------- General privacy issues involving taxpaying, licensing, social security numbers, etc. alt.privacy.anon-server ----------------------- Spillover of debate on news.admin.policy regarding anonymous servers. alt.privacy.clipper ------------------- Group dedicated to discussing technical/political aspects of the Clipper chip. alt.security comp.security.misc ------------------ Computer related security issues. FAQ in news.answers below. alt.security.pgp alt.security.ripem ---------------- Dedicated to discussing public domain cryptographic software packages: PGP, or ``Pretty Good Privacy'' Software developed by Phil Zimmerman for public key encryption, and RIPEM by Mark Riordan for public key and DES encryption. comp.society.privacy -------------------- Privacy issues associated with computer technologies. Examples: caller identification, social security numbers, credit applications, mailing lists, etc. Moderated. comp.org.eff.news comp.org.eff.talk ----------------- Moderated and unmoderated groups associated with the Electronic Frontier Foundation started by Mitch Kapor for protecting civil and constitutional rights in the electronic realm. news.admin news.admin.policy ----------------- Concerns of news administrators. NNTP standards and mechanisms. news.lists ---------- USENET traffic distributions. Most frequent posters, most voluminous groups, most active sites, etc. sci.crypt --------- Considers scientific and social issues of cryptography. Examples: legitimate use of PGP, public-key patents, DES, cryptographic security, cypher breaking, etc. FAQs ==== FAQs or ``Frequently-Asked Questions'' are available in the newsgroups *.answers or via anonymous FTP to pit-manager.mit.edu [18.172.1.27] (also rtfm.mit.edu) from the directory /pub/usenet/news.answers/[x] where [x] is the archive name. This FAQ is archived in the file `net-privacy'. Others are: network-info/part1 ------------------ Sources of information about the Internet and how to connect to it, through the NSF or commercial vendors. alt-security-faq ---------------- Computer related security issues arising in alt.security and comp.security.misc, mostly UNIX related. ssn-privacy ----------- Privacy issues associated with the use of the U.S. Social Security number (SSN). pdial ----- Public dialup internet accounts list. college-email/part1 ------------------- How to find email addresses for undergraduate and graduate students, faculty and staff at various colleges and universities. ripem/faq --------- Information on RIPEM, a program for public key mail encryption officially sanctioned by Public Key Partners Inc., the company that owns patents on public key cryptography. unix-faq/faq/part1 ------------------ Frequently-asked questions about UNIX, including information on `finger' and terminal spying. distributions/* --------------- Known geographic, university, and network distributions. _____ <6.5> What is internet Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM)? Internet drafts on Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) describe a standard under revision for six years delineating the official protocols for email encryption. The standard has only recently stabilized and implementations are being developed. - RFC-1421: ``Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication Procedures.'' J. Linn <104-8456@mcimail.com> - RFC-1422: ``Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management'' S. Kent <Kent@BBN.com> - RFC-1424: ``Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part IV: Key Certification and Related Services'' B. Kaliski <burt@rsa.com> - RFC-1423: ``Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part III: Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers'' D. Balenson <belenson@tis.com> Send email to pem-info@tis.com for more information. See ``RFCs related to privacy'' for information on how to obtain RFCs. _____ <6.6> What are other Request For Comments (RFCs) related to privacy? RFC-822: SMTP, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol RFC-977: NNTP, Network News Transfer Protocol RFC-1036: Standard for interchange of network news messages RFC-1208: Glossary of Networking Terms RFC-1207: Answers to ``experienced Internet user'' questions RFC-1206: Answers to ``new Internet user'' questions RFC-1355: Privacy issues in Network Information center databases RFC-1177 is ``FYI: Answers to commonly asked ``new internet user'' questions, and includes: basic terminology on the Internet (TCP/IP, SMTP, FTP), internet organizations such as IAB (Internet Activities Board) and IETF (Internet Enbgineering Task Force), and a glossary of terms. Also from ftp.eff.org: /pub/internet-info/internet.q. > RFCs can be obtained via FTP from NIC.DDN.MIL, with the pathname > RFC:RFCnnnn.TXT or RFC:RFCnnnn.PS (where `nnnn' refers to the > number of the RFC). Login with FTP, username `anonymous' and > password `guest'. The NIC also provides an automatic mail > service for those sites which cannot use FTP. Address the > request to SERVICE@NIC.DDN.MIL and in the subject field of the > message indicate the RFC number, as in `Subject: RFC nnnn' (or > `Subject: RFC nnnn.PS' for PostScript RFCs). > > RFCs can also be obtained via FTP from NIS.NSF.NET. Using FTP, > login with username `anonymous' and password `guest'; then > connect to the RFC directory (`cd RFC'). The file name is of the > form RFCnnnn.TXT-1 (where `nnnn' refers to the number of the > RFC). The NIS also provides an automatic mail service for those > sites which cannot use FTP. Address the request to > NIS-INFO@NIS.NSF.NET and leave the subject field of the message > blank. The first line of the text of the message must be `SEND > RFCnnnn.TXT-1', where nnnn is replaced by the RFC number. _____ <6.7> How can I run an anonymous remailer? Cypherpunk remailer source is at soda.berkeley.edu in the /pub/cypherpunks directory. It's written in PERL, and is relatively easy to install (no administrative rights are required) although basic familiarity with UNIX is necessary. Karl Barrus <elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu> has more information and modifications. Also, most remailer operators mentioned above are amenable to discussing features, problems, and helping new sites become operational. Address all points in the section ``responsibities of anonymous use'' in this document prior to advertising your service. You should be committed to the long-term stability of the site and avoid running one surreptitiously. _____ <6.8> What are references on privacy in email? Brown, Bob. ``EMA Urges Users to Adopt Policy on E-mail Privacy.'' Network World (Oct 29, 1990), 7.44: 2. Bairstow, Jeffrey. ``Who Reads your Electronic Mail?'' Electronic Business (June 11, 1990) 16 (11): 92. ``Electronic Envelopes - the uncertainty of keeping e-mail private'' Scientific American, February 1993. ftp.eff.org =========== /pub/eff/papers/email_privacy --- Article on the rights of email privacy. by Ruel T. Hernandez. /pub/academic/law/privacy.email --- ``Computer Electronic Mail and Privacy'', an edited version of a law school seminar paper by Ruel T. Hernadez. /pub/eff/papers/email-privacy-biblio-2 --- Compilation of bibliography on E-Mail and its privacy issues (part 2 of the work). Compiled by Stacy B. Veeder (12/91). /pub/eff/papers/email-privacy-research --- The author at Digital Research tried to formalize their employee privacy policy on E-Mail. The casesightings are divided into two groups: US Constitutional law, and California law. /pub/eff/papers/company-email --- Formulating a Company Policy on Access to and Disclosure of Electronic Mail on Company Computer Systems by David R. Johnson and John Podesta for the Electronic Mail Assocation /pub/cud/alcor --- Information on Alcor Co., an e-mail privacy suit. /pub/academic/law/privacy.email --- Email privacy search at Berkeley. _____ <6.9> What are some email, Usenet, and internet use policies? The Computer Policy and Critiques Archive is a collection of the computer policies of many schools and networks, run by the Computers and Academic Freedom group on the Electronic Frontier Foundation FTP site. The collection also includes critiques of some of the policies. > If you have gopher, the archive is browsable with the command: > gopher -p academic/policies gopher.eff.org > > The archive is also accessible via anonymous ftp and email. Ftp > to ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4). It is in directory > `pub/academic/policies'. For email access, send email to > archive-server@eff.org. Include the line: > > send acad-freedom/policies <filenames> > > where <filenames> is a list of the files that you want. File > README is a detailed description of the items in the directory. > > For more information, to make contributions, or to report typos > contact J.S. Greenfield (greeny@eff.org). Directory `widener' > contains additional policies (but not critiques). ftp.eff.org =========== /pub/cud/networks --- Acceptable Use Policies for various networks, including CompuServe (file `compuserve'), NSFNET (file `nsfnet') with information on research and commercial uses. See /pub/cud/networks/index. /pub/cud/networks/email --- Policies from various sysadmins about how they handle the issue of email privacy, control, and abuse, compiled by T. Hooper <hooper_ta@cc.curtin.edu.au>. /pub/cud/schools/ --- Computer use policies of a number of schools. See schools/Index for a full list and description. Commentary ========== /pub/academic/faq/policy.best --- Opinions on the best academic computer policies. /pub/academic/faq/email.policies --- Do any universities treat email and computer files as private? /pub/academic/faq/netnews.writing --- Policies on what users write on Usenet. /pub/academic/faq/netnews.reading --- Policies on what users read on Usenet: should my university remove (or restrict) Netnews newsgroups because some people find them offensive? /pub/academic/faq/policy --- What guidance is there for creating or evaluating a university's academic computer policy? MISCELLANEOUS ============= _____ <7.1> What is ``digital cash''? With digital encryption and authentication technologies, the possibility of a widespread digital cash system may someday be realized. A system utilizing codes sent between users and banks (similar to today's checking system except entirely digital) may be one approach. The issues of cryptography, privacy, and anonymity are closely associated with transfer of cash in an economy. See the article in Scientific American by David Chaum (~Dec.1992). An experimental digital bank is run by Karl Barrus <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU> based on suggestions by Hal Finney on the cypherpunks mailing list. To use the server send mail to elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu message with the following text: :: command: help user@host where `user@host' is your email address. _____ <7.2> What is a ``hacker'' or ``cracker''? These terms arouse strong feelings by many on their meaning, especially on the internet. In the general news media in the past a person who uses computers and networks to malicious ends (such as breaking into systems) has been referred to as a hacker, but most internet users prefer the term ``cracker'' for this. Instead, a ``hacker'' is perceived as a benign but intensely ambitious, curious, and driven computer user who explores obscure areas of a system, for example---something of a proud electronic pioneer and patriot. This is the sense intended in this document. See also the ``Hacker's Dictionary'' and the FAQ `alt-security-faq'. _____ <7.3> What is a ``cypherpunk''? From the charter of the cypherpunk mailing list: > Cypherpunks assume privacy is a good thing and wish there were > more of it. Cypherpunks acknowledge that those who want privacy > must create it for themselves and not expect governments, > corporations, or other large, faceless organizations to grant > them privacy out of beneficence. Cypherpunks know that people > have been creating their own privacy for centuries with whispers, > envelopes, closed doors, and couriers. Cypherpunks do not seek > to prevent other people from speaking about their experiences or > their opinions. See information on the cypherpunk mailing list below. See also the CryptoAnarchist Manifesto and the Cryptography Glossary in soda.berkeley.edu:/pub/cypherpunks. _____ <7.4> What is `steganography' and anonymous pools? Closely associated with encryption is `steganography' or the techniques for not only pursuing private (encrypted) communication but concealing the very existence of the communication itself. Many new possibilities in this area are introduced with the proliferation of computer technology. For example, it is possible to encode messages in the least-significant bits of images, typically the most 'noisy'. In addition, when such an item is posted in a public place (such as a newsgroup), virtually untraceable communication can take place between sender and receiver. For steganographic communications in the electronic realm one another possibility is setting up a mailing list where individual messages get broadcast to the entire list and individual users decode particular messages with their unique key. An anonymous pool has been set up by Miron Cuperman (miron@extropia.wimsey.com) for experiments. Send email to <pool0-request@extropia.wimsey.com> with one of the following commands in the subject line: subscribe unsubscribe help _____ <7.5> What is `security through obscurity'? `Security through obscurity' refers to the attempt to gain protection from system weaknesses by hiding sensitive information or programs relating to them. For example, a company may not make public information on its software's encryption techniques to evade `attacks' based on knowledge of it. Another example would be concealing data on the existence of security holes or bugs in operating systems. Or, some reliance may be made on the fact that some standard or mechanism with potential problems is serious because they are ``not widely known'' or ``not widely used.'' This argument is occasionally applied to mechanisms for email and Usenet posting `forgery'. `Security through obscurity' is regarded as a very feeble technique at best and inappropriate and ineffective at worst (also called the ``head-in-the-sand approach''). See the FAQ for alt.security. Some remarks of John Perry Barlow, cofounder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, directed to NSA agents at the First International Symposium on National Security & National Competitiveness held in McLean, Virginia Dec. 1, 1992: > Digitized information is very hard to stamp classified or keep > contained. ... This stuff is incredibly leaky and volatile. It's > almost a life form in its ability to self-propagate. If > something hits the Net and it's something which people on there > find interesting it will spread like a virus of the mind. I > believe you must simply accept the idea that we are moving into > an environment where any information which is at all interesting > to people is going to get out. And there will be very little > that you can do about it. This is not a bad thing in my view, > but you may differ... _____ <7.6> What are `identity daemons'? RFC-931 describes a protocol standard that allows UNIX programs to query a remote user's login name after connection to a local communication socket (a connection of this type is established during FTP and TELNET sessions, for example). The standard is not widely supported, perhaps 10% of internet sites currently implement it but the number is increasing. The mechanism is detrimental to anonymity. Regular users cannot disable it but system adminstrators can circumvent it. This standard may represent a trend toward greater authentication mechanisms. _____ <7.7> What standards are needed to guard electronic privacy? Remailing/Posting ----------------- - Stable, secure, protected, officially sanctioned and permitted, publicly and privately operated anonymous servers and hubs. - Official standards for encryption and anonymity in mail and USENET postings. - Truly anonymous protocols with source and destination information obscured or absent and hidden routing mechanisms (chaining, encrypted addresses, etc.) - Standards for anonymous email addressing, embedding files, and remailer site chaining. General ------- - Recognition of anonymity, cryptography, and related privacy shields as legitimate, useful, desirable, and crucial by the general public and their governments. - Widespread use and implementation of these technologies by systems designers into hardware, software, and standards, implemented `securely,' `seamlessly,' and `transparently'. - General shift of use, dependence, and reliance to means other than wiretapping and electronic surveillance by law enforcement agencies. - Publicity, retraction, and dissolution of laws and government agencies opposed to privacy, replaced by structures dedicated to strengthening and protecting it. FOOTNOTES ========= _____ <8.1> What is the background behind the Internet? The article ``Internet'' in Fantasy and Science Fiction by Bruce Sterling <bruces@well.sf.ca.us> contains general and nontechnical introductory notes on origins of the Internet, including the role of the RAND corporation, the goal of network resilience in face of nuclear attack, MIT, UCLA, ARPANET, TCP/IP, NSF, NREN, etc.: > ARPANET itself formally expired in 1989, a happy victim of its > own overwhelming success. Its users scarcely noticed, for > ARPANET's functions not only continued but steadily improved. > The use of TCP/IP standards for computer networking is now > global. In 1971, a mere twenty-one years ago, there were only > four nodes in the ARPANET network. Today there are tens of > thousands of nodes in the Internet, scattered over forty-two > countries, with more coming on-line every day. Three million, > possibly four million people use this gigantic > mother-of-all-computer-networks. > > The Internet is especially popular among scientists, and is > probably the most important scientific instrument of the late > twentieth century. The powerful, sophisticated access that it > provides to specialized data and personal communication has sped > up the pace of scientific research enormously. > > The Internet's pace of growth in the early 1990s is spectacular, > almost ferocious. It is spreading faster than cellular phones, > faster than fax machines. Last year the Internet was growing at > a rate of twenty percent a *month.* The number of `host' > machines with direct connection to TCP/IP has been doubling > every year since 1988. The Internet is moving out of its > original base in military and research institutions, into > elementary and high schools, as well as into public libraries > and the commercial sector. References ========== Bowers, K., T. LaQuey, J. Reynolds, K. Roubicek, M. Stahl, and A. Yuan, ``Where to Start - A Bibliography of General Internetworking Information'' (RFC-1175), CNRI, U Texas, ISI, BBN, SRI, Mitre, August 1990. The Whole Internet Catalog & User's Guide by Ed Krol. (1992) O'Reilly and Associates, Inc. --- A clear, non-jargonized introduction to the intimidating business of network literacy written in humorous style. Krol, E., ``The Hitchhikers Guide to the Internet'' (RFC-1118), University of Illinois Urbana, September 1989. ``The User's Directory to Computer Networks'', by Tracy LaQuey. The Matrix: Computer Networks and Conferencing Systems Worldwide. by John Quarterman. Digital Press: Bedford, MA. (1990) --- Massive and highly technical compendium detailing the mind-boggling scope and complexity of global internetworks. ``!%@:: A Directory of Electronic Mail Addressing and Networks'' by Donnalyn Frey and Rick Adams. The Internet Companion, by Tracy LaQuey with Jeanne C. Ryer (1992) Addison Wesley. --- ``Evangelical'' etiquette guide to the Internet featuring anecdotal tales of life-changing Internet experiences. Foreword by Senator Al Gore. Zen and the Art of the Internet: A Beginner's Guide by Brendan P. Kehoe (1992) Prentice Hall. --- Brief but useful Internet guide with plenty of good advice on useful databases. See also ftp.eff.com:/pub/internet-info/. (Thanks to Bruce Sterling <bruces@well.sf.ca.us> for contributions here.) General ======= Cunningham, Scott and Alan L. Porter. ``Communication Networks: A dozen ways they'll change our lives.'' The Futurist 26, 1 (January-February, 1992): 19-22. Brian Kahin, ed., BUILDING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992) ISBN# 0-390-03083-X --- Essays on information infrastructure. Policy and design issues, research and NREN, future visions, information markets. See table of contents in ftp.eff.org:/pub/pub-infra/1992-03. Shapard, Jeffrey. ``Observations on Cross-Cultural Electronic Networking.'' Whole Earth Review (Winter) 1990: 32-35. Varley, Pamela. ``Electronic Democracy.'' Technology Review (November/December, 1991): 43-51. ______ <8.2> How is Internet `anarchy' like the English language? According to Bruce Sterling <bruces@well.sf.ca.us>: > The Internet's `anarchy' may seem strange or even unnatural, but > it makes a certain deep and basic sense. It's rather like the > `anarchy' of the English language. Nobody rents English, and > nobody owns English. As an English-speaking person, it's up > to you to learn how to speak English properly and make whatever > use you please of it (though the government provides certain > subsidies to help you learn to read and write a bit). > Otherwise, everybody just sort of pitches in, and somehow the > thing evolves on its own, and somehow turns out workable. And > interesting. Fascinating, even. Though a lot of people earn > their living from using and exploiting and teaching English, > `English' as an institution is public property, a public good. > Much the same goes for the Internet. Would English be improved > if the `The English Language, Inc.' had a board of directors > and a chief executive officer, or a President and a Congress? > There'd probably be a lot fewer new words in English, and a lot > fewer new ideas. _____ <8.3> Most Wanted list Hopefully you have benefitted from this creation, compilation, and condensation of information from various sources regarding privacy, identity, and anonymity on the internet. The author is committed to keeping this up-to-date and strengthening it, but this can only be effective with your feedback, especially on sections of interest. In particular, the following items are sought: - Short summaries of RFC documents and other references listed, esp. CPSR files. - More data on the specific uses and penetration of RFC-931. - Internet traffic statistics. How much is email? How much USENET? What are the costs involved? - Famous or obscure examples of compromised privacy on the internet. - FTP site for the code (NOT the code) to turn the .plan file into a named pipe for sensing/reacting to remote `fingers'. - X Windows, EFF, CPSR FAQhood in news.answers. Commerical use of this document is negotiable and is a way for the author to recoup from a significant time investment. Email feedback to ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu. Please note where you saw this (which newsgroup, etc.). _____ <8.4> Change history 5/7/93 v3.0 (current) Revisions/additions to Anonymity history. Anonymity history & commentary moved to new FAQ. Information on the Clipper chip initiative. Minor miscellaneous corrections. Crosslink program info deleted. Some EFF out-of-date file pointers not fixed. 3/3/93 v2.1 CPSR pointer, new UNIX mode examples, digital telephony act, Steve Jackson incident, additions/ reorganization to anonymity section, part 3. Note: v2.0 post to sci.crypt, alt.privacy, news.answers, alt.answers, sci.answers was cancelled by J. Kamens because of incorrect subject line. 2/14/93 v2.0 Major revisions. New section for X Windows. Some email privacy items reorganized to network security section. New sections for email liability issues, anonymity history and responsibilities. Split into three files. Many new sources added, particularly from EFF and CAF in new `issues' part. `commentary' from news.admin.policy. 21 day automated posting starts. 2/3/93 v1.0 More newsgroups & FAQs added. More `Most Wanted'. Posted to news.answers. Future monthly posting to sci.crypt, alt.privacy. 2/1/93 v0.3 Formatted to 72 columns for quoting etc. `miscellaneous,' `resources' sections added with cypherpunk servers and use warnings. More UNIX examples (`ls' and `chmod'). Posted to alt.privacy, comp.society.privacy. 1/29/93 v0.2 `Identity' and `Privacy' sections added. `Anonymity' expanded. Remailer addresses removed due to lack of information and instability. Posted to sci.crypt. 1/25/93 v0.1 Originally posted to the cypherpunks mailing list on 1/25/93 as a call to organize a list of anonymous servers. email ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu for earlier versions. * * * This is Part 3 of the Privacy & Anonymity FAQ, obtained via anonymous FTP to pit-manager@mit.edu:/pub/usenet/news.answers/net-privacy/ or newsgroups news.answers, sci.answers, alt.answers every 21 days. Written by L. Detweiler <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>. All rights reserved. .